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LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL. By Chester Rohrlich.
Voorhis & Co., New York, 1933. Pp. vii, 268. Price: $3.50.

Baker,

Since the appearance of Berle and Means' brilliant study of the Modern
Corporationand Private Property, the announcement of a new book on the law
relating to control of business corporations inevitably raises hopes that its author
will dig well below the surface of the welter of judicial opinions and reveal the
underlying factors of past history and present economic and social policy which
are moulding that law. The relatively large corporations which represent the
major portion of the corporate wealth of the country at the present time involve
a separation between ownership and control that was far less characteristic of
the corporations of even a generation ago, and this and other changes in the
character of the economic institution which the law is seeking to regulate requires considerable judicial as well as legislative modification of earlier legal
theories. Mr. Rohrlich's introductory chapter, entitled Problems of Corporate
Control, indicates that he is well aware that such is the case, but the remainder
of his book, despite its substantial merits, fails to live up to the expectations
aroused by its initial pages.
Following this introductory chapter, Mr. Rohrlich deals successively with
government control, control through voting power, stockholders' right to information, protective committees, minority stockholders' suits, creditor control,
and problems of control peculiar to close corporations. This arrangement tends
towards a realistic approach to a number of corporate problems by viewing them
as questions either of control by shareholders or of remedies available to individual shareholders against those who exercise control. This realistic attitude is
further indicated by the citation of a large number of economic and legal books
and articles, in which corporate problems are treated primarily from the standpoint of social policy rather than of formalistic legal reasoning. The author
often displays considerable skill in summarizing the conclusions of these writers, but makes no substantial contributions of his own to the solution of control
problems.
After a rather unsuccessful attempt to compress into a chapter of fifteen
pages all methods of governmental control which constitute regulation of business corporations as such rather than control over business in general, he begins,
in Chapter III, to deal with what is obviously his primary interest-the law
relating to the internal control of the business corporation. This chapter, entitled
Corporate Voting: Majority and Minority Control, is valuable chiefly for its
unusually full citation of authorities on the validity of agreements regarding
voting which do not involve the creation of a formal voting trust. Here the
author criticizes effectively the failure of many courts to distinguish sufficiently
between political and business associations and their undue reluctance to treat
the small close corporation as essentially a kind of partnership. On the other
hand, his contention that in view of legislative recognition of non-voting stock
and voting trusts, the courts should treat voting rights as a mere species of property which can validly be sold to the highest bidder, although put forward as
realism, ignores distinctions that are by no means without substance. The fact
that this chapter, which deals primarily with devices for separating voting power
from ownership, is followed immediately by one on the stockholders' right to
information leads us to hope that the latter chapter will tell us something of the
extent to which such devices as the holding company and the voting trust legally
insulate the operating enterprise from the investor so as to deprive him of his
right to examine its books-a hope which proves altogether vain.
(666)
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The protective committee, treated in the next chapter, is properly dealt with
as an instrument for control, but despite a summary of the provisions usually
found in deposit agreements, the author's treatment is such as to give the reader
scarcely a hint that such agreements are normally designed to vest control in the
committees as masters rather than as servants of the depositing security holders.
That agreements are so drawn is a fact which is likely to have important legal
consequences. As Mr. Rohrlich himself indicates in another connection, it
should affect the weight which courts and commissions give to the claim of
protective committees that their voice is the voice of the majority of the security
holders. There is, also, a serious question whether the traditional form of deposit agreement is consistent with the provision in the railroad reorganization
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act to the effect that railroad reorganization
plans may be accepted on behalf of a creditor or stockholder only under authority
executed by him after the plan has been recommended by the Interstate Commerce Commission.'
Mr. Rohrlich's next chapter, on Suits in Equity by Minority Stockholders,
suffers from uncertainty of aim. Although most of its seventy pages are concerned with litigation designed to enjoin or set aside acts done by majority
stockholders, there are occasional attempts to deal in a sketchy way with stockholders' complaints of misconduct by directors and officers. The treatment of
wrongdoing by majority stockholders is reasonably adequate, but fails to point
out clearly that the development of the holding company and the increasing
tendency to divide stock into classes has greatly increased the likelihood that the
interests of majority and minority will be in conflict and that the latter will need
judicial protection against the former.
Chapter VII, entitled Creditor Control: Operating Receiverships; Reorganizations, is the best in the book. The first part of it suffers from such defects as the uncritical acceptance of judicial statements that the purchase of its
own stock by a corporation having no surplus does not involve a reduction of
capital; but in dealing with receivership and reorganization Mr. Rohrlich has
constructed, out of the mass of judicial and non-judicial writing on the subject,
an accurate and illuminating account not only of the present rules of the game
but of some of the more outstanding defects in those rules. Certain important
questions are ignored or inadequately treated. There is no treatment of the
difficulties which a court that adheres to the usual practice of postponing consideration of the reorganization plan until the confirmation of the foreclosure
sale will have in dealing justly at that late stage with contentions of dissenters
that the plan is unfair, and no attempt to integrate the previous chapter on protective committees with the other aspects of reorganization. Nevertheless, the
chapter is, on the whole, a successful attempt to give in less than thirty pages
an informative picture of the process of receivership and reorganization from
the lawyer's point of view.
The final brief chapter, on the close corporation, which appears to be based
largely on Weiner's recent article, 2 is a brief but illuminating account of the
pitfalls which legislatures and courts have dug for those who seek to create
what is essentially a partnership within the framework of the corporation laws,
and the extent to which those pitfalls may be avoided by skillful legal draftsmanship.
Taken as a whole, the book is a useful guide to the principal legal problems
which center around corporate control as well as a handy collection of recent
'The substance of this chapter originally appeared in (1932) So U. OF PA. L. REv. 67o .
It is unfortunate that in revising it the author did not consider the implications of the railroad reorganization amendment of 1933 with respect to the proper function of protective
committees.
2
Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation (1929) 27 Micn. L. REv. 273.
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court decisions and other writings which deal with those problems. Despite
occasional shrewd comments, it fails to make any important contributions to
legal thinking; but it may be that the reviewer was mistaken in interpreting
certain language in the introductory chapter as indicating that the author was
attempting an accomplishment of that sort. In these days of rapid change in
our economic institutions and in the law by which they are regulated, no book
on the law of corporate control can, however, be more than a minor convenience
for the lawyer unless its author is willing to think constructively and is fitted
for such thinking both by wide knowledge of past and present legal and business traditions and by imaginative insight into the social and economic implications of legal rules.
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.
Harvard Law School.

BRANDEIS: LAWYER AND JUDGE IN THE MODERN STATE.

Mason.

Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1933.

By Alpheus Thomas
Pp. vii, 203. $2.00.

The life of perhaps no other living American is richer and deeper in
meaning for these times than that of Mr. justice Brandeis. In the year 1934
virtually all that he has thought and said and done in the more than forty
years of his public career seems to come to significant focus. As a member
of the United States Supreme Court he is the protagonist of a mode of thinking about issues of constitutional decision which has suddenly become of critical import in the history of the Court and the nation. As a lawyer his steady
refusal to consider law in any other terms than those of its bearing upon the
realities of social and economic life and his labors of a lifetime in demonstrating the fruitfulness of that view stand as a reproach and a challenge to the
intelligence of the legal profession.1 As an economist he finds himself among
the foremost of that slender company whose insight the years have vindicated.
His extraordinary faculty for creative social thought had .never such immediacy
of interest as now when "social invention" is the order of the day the country
over. As a critic of American life he is in his own person a link between all
the principal movements of protest and reform from the muckrakers of the
nineties to the New Deal of 1933 and 1934.

More important than all these,

perhaps as an epitome of them, he is, among those who have thought about the
methods and the meaning of government, one of the few really important persons in the world today.
Abundant reason there is, therefore for being grateful for the appearance
of Professor Mason's essay. It provides in small compass an accurate and
remarkably full account of a many-sided individual, and in doing so succeeds
measurably in placing him in the context of the constitutional and economic
developments of his time. Few studies of comparable quality, it is fair to say,
have been made of any of the seventy-eight men who have sat on the Supreme
Court of the United States. 2 Regarded alone as a popular essay in constitutional law, the book is admirable. An opening chapter discusses with underCompare this, from the Report of the Dean of the School of Law, Columbia University, for the period ending June 30, 1933, Bulletin of Information, 34th Ser., No. 19,
P. 4: "The effective use of law and of administrative devices in furtherance of social
policies requires the services of men who are not only legal technicians, but who are able
to envisage and understand the social problems involved and the manner in which law
may be used most advantageously in this solution. The demand ,for such men in recent
months has greatly exceeded the supply . . . At the same time, the opportunities for
lawyers along traditional lines have steadily decreased."
'See the list of biographical studies of the Justices in FRANKFURTER AND KATZ, CASES
AND OTHER AuTHORIIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTrON AND PROCEDURE (1931)

745, 746.
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standing the Supreme Court's r6le in American life; and in later chapters are
excellent accounts of recent trends in constitutional decision. Primarily the
book is designed for laymen, but plainly its usefulness, and interest, are not thus
limited.
Perhaps it is only because its subject suggests the possibilities of so much
finer an accomplishment that the reviewer nevertheless finds the book in many
respects disappointing. It is disappointing, for one thing, as a portrait and as
a story. Professor Mason writes abstractly of ideas and events, reporting and
appraising them as one might in the limbo of the lecture-room. The resulting
picture is regrettably bloodless. The preface indeed warns that "no formal
biography is attempted"; chiefly "public welfare activities . . . ideology . . .

constitutional principles" are considered. 3 But the "ideology" of a man is a
disembodied, academic conception. Particularly is it so, as applied to Mr.
Justice Brandeis, who of all men has lived his ideas, demonstrating to the
world a triumphant integrity of mind and action. The account in the second
chapter of the Justice's early training and of his career at the bar is disorganized
and spotty, scarcely as adequate as many of the feature stories that filled the
columns of the newspapers in the spring of 1916. Throughout those eventful
years Brandeis was making himself decisively felt in the diagnosis and treatment, one after another, of the most acute social problems of the day-insurance, control of public utilities, the organization of business, banking and
finance, industrial relations, railroad rate regulation, conservation of natural
resources; was altering indeed the very terms in which many of those problems are conceived today. More than this, as the attacks upon him were soon
to make abundantly clear, he was attacking fundamentally the morals, the intelligence, and the faith of his generation. There is no more stirring story of
any lawyer in the modern state than this, and one wishes that Professor Mason
bad taken the opportunity to tell it more coherently, more fully and more
vividly. Some day it will be told in detail as an integral part of the history
of those seminal years from 189o to the great war.
These criticisms, however, do not touch the value of what Professor
Mason has done for the general reader, in conveying a sense of the significance
of Mr. Justice Brandeis' presence on the Court and of the impact of his thought
upon law and upon those public questions with which as a lawyer he has been
concerned. It must be said that other men have done this also, and done it
with deeper insight-notably Laski in a recent Harpers paper, - and some of
the contributors to the collection of essays edited last year by Mr. Frankfurter. But this book, partly because it is a book, is more complete and betterrounded. Those with no more than casual information or understanding about
the Justice or the Court would certainly do well to read it before anything
else. Besides the chapters already mentioned dealing generally with the work of
the Court and with Brandeis as a practicing lawyer, there is an excellent discussion, in detail, of "the Brandeis brief" and its influence. A long succeeding chapter, constituting with the conclusion more than a third of the book,
reviews certain of the Justice's more important opinions and appraises the social philosophy disclosed therein.0
One puts down the book with an abiding impression of a great lawyer
and a great judge. Still many questions remain unanswered. Professor Mason,
'P. v.
'Laski, Mr. Justice Brandeis (Jan. 1934) 168 HARPEas MAGAZINE 209.
'MR. JusTica BRAbmEIs (1932).
See especially the papers by Lerner, Hamilton and
Frankfurter.
'The social philosophy and the opinions sometimes get mixed-it is dangerous to attempt to piece together a judge's personal views from the policies expressed in the various
statutes whose constitutionality he has upheld. I question, for example, the interpretation
which Professor Mason places on Brandeis' prohibition opinions. P. 17o et seq.
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it is almost accurate to say, writes to defend Mr. Justice Brandeis against the
past rather than the future. At a whole range of issues he scarcely hints. The
most serious criticism of Brandeis' thinking comes today not from his enemies
but from his friends. Laski speaks of his social philosophy as "a nobly romantic anachronism".' Llewellyn finds in his position "the essence of tragedy"."
Morris R. Cohen in a penetrating book review elaborates his reasons for thinking "that the liberal tradition of 1776 and 1848 which he so gloriously represents will be strengthened if divorced from the antiquated and a priorieconomic
individualism which he sometimes professes". 9 One wishes that this book had
dealt with these problems, or that another one would. Has the effort of Mr.
Justice Brandeis at "the re-orientation of historic America to the new environment of giant capitalism" 1o become indeed an anachronism? Have competition and production for private profit no substantial uses to be salvaged, either
of conservation of human values or of economy of social effort? Is indiscriminate bigness in industry, despite its evils, to be accepted as inexorable, and
therefore to be encouraged; or is there a choice between an allopathic and a
homeopathic treatment? Must we embark incontinently upon a program of
planned production, or is social planning possible in a different sense which
takes discriminating account of the resources and aims of democratic government, exploring alternatives (as, for example, a thorough-going revision of the
scheme of taxation), seeking to attain its ends by other means than direct
manipulation of the controls? No reasoned answer to any of these questions
is likely to be reached which does not take account of the thinking of Mr.
Justice Brandeis. I feel a double lack in this respect in Professor Mason's
book-a failure adequately to present the views which the Justice has at various times expressed and a failure adequately to criticize them.
Henry M. Hart, Jr.
Harvard Law School.

DOUBLE

TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INCOME.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1933.

By Arthur Leon Harding.
Pp. x, 326. Price: $3.50.

It is but a few years ago that the Supreme Court of the United States deliberately rejected theories that bad guided its decisions in defining the jurisdictional limits on the states' taxing power, and in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota,1 gave predominant importance to the avoidance of multi-state inleritance taxation of the transfer of intangible personalty. Later decisions have
applied the same principle to types of intangible personalty other than bonds.
This series of decisions has led to numerous attempts by writers to develop the
implications of these cases for other types of tax, and estimate the probabilities
that the Court will give its approval to some or all of these implications. Professor Harding's book, the first of the Harvard Studies in the Conflict of Laws,
is the first comprehensive treatment of this subject. It is an attempt to discover the new principle inherent therein, to verify it in the sense of determining
its efficacy to explain and organize the existing body of decisions into a consistent system, and to employ it in developing the decisions indicated thereby
for situations on which the Court has not yet definitively committed itself against
multi-state taxation. He begins with a general survey of the course of deci"Supra
note of
4, the
at 216.
'In a review
present book, (Nov. 18, 1933) I ToDAY 19.
'Book Review (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 165, 16q.
' Laski, s=pra note 4, at 214.
'280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (193o).

BOOK REVIEWS

sions before and after the crucial year 193o, and quite rightly concludes therefrom that those decisions cannot be organized into a consistent system in which
either the "protection" or "power" principle of taxations constitutes the premise
from which those decisions can be derived. He, therefore, formulates his principle of economic integration. The remainder of the discussion applies that
principle to the various types of tax. The ad valorem tax on property and the
income tax receive by far the longer treatments. It is undoubtedly fair to
assume that the purpose of those discussions is to establish that the theory is
sustained by the decided cases, rationalizes the distinctions and demarcations
that appear therein, constitutes the substance of what was in the judicial mind
in making those distinctions, and furnishes an adequate tool for future rational
and just decisions. This is, in substance, the author's definition of the verification of his theory.
Any appraisal of the author's success in performing this task requires a
fuller statement of his theory. It is that "the right to tax depends upon tlie
fact that the economic wealth is being used in the co-ordinated economic task
of the social group; that it is producing utility or wealth or service in connection with, as a part of, and because of the economic solidarity of the social
group; or that it has been so situated by the owner that its value or utility is
increased because of the effect upon it of this interplay of individual and group
purpose and enterprise." The specific content of this extremely general and
rather vague principle can only be derived by inference from the manner in
which it functions in the author's discussion to prove that the decided cases
embody it even when not explicitly invoking it. It is not always easy to follow
the author in his discussions on these matters. At times his treatment of the
decided cases seems rather arbitrary, at least if the consciously formulated
reasons of the courts be taken as the test, and the reviewer at least is not inclined to treat those as insignificant in order to attach predominant importance
to the unconscious gropings of the judicial mind. The substance of the author's
position seems to be no more than an argument that economic factors have
played an important part in judicial reasoning in dealing with the jurisdiction
of states to tax, and that they should constitute the dominant factor in shaping
future decisions in the field. With this the reviewer is in hearty accord, but
he does not believe that the course of decisions can be integrated into a consistent system on that basis any more than they can be thus organized on the
basis of the principles which the author rightly rejects in the early part of his
discussions. However, acceptance of the integration test still leaves numerous
problems as to just what facts will suffice in law to integrate particular taxabe
subjects into the social and economic milieu of the taxing state; that is, what
economic factors should, be given decisive influence in formulating this part of
our law. The difficulties do not vanish, nor is their solution made any easier,
by rephrasing the problems in terms of the author's theory. His principle, furthermore, leans heavily on the theory of social solidarity and the contribution
of society to the economic welfare of those taxed. No one can deny this, but
in many instances the social and economic group making this contribution is not
set off along state lines, whereas the jurisdictional problem is perforce stated
in terms of state power. Take for example, the case of ad valorem taxation
of goods in interstate transit through a state. If account be taken of what the
economist calls "place utilities", then the state through which the goods are
passing, and its economic structure, do make important contributions to the
wealth production process. Even the "institutional economists" would agree
to that. It is clear, therefore, that the theory requires more detailed exposition than is contained in this book to give a proper basis for its appraisal. The
author frankly admits that "legal categories" of wealth must be taken into
account in matters of jurisdiction to tax. This is correct, but, so far as those
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legal categories introduce elements that in substance permit the multiplication
of taxable wealth with no increase in actual wealth, the economic integration
test falls down. This is exactly what has happened with judicial approval.
Hence, it seems that the verification of the author's theory, measured in terms
of the standard he himself has laid down, has not been wholly successful. That,
however, is not the author's fault. The facts, i. e., the decisions, are against
him in this matter.
The fact that the author has not succeeded in accomplishing the impossible does not in the least detract from the high merits of his contribution. The
vast array of materials comprehended is organized in a most effective manner,
and the style is both clear and interesting. The general position maintained that
economic factors should play a more important r6le in this field of the law is
correct, and the analysis of the cases from this angle is exceedingly well done.
The author, however, is a bit more dogmatic in developing the implications of
the Supreme Court's recent decisions involving inheritance taxes than the facts
seem to warrant. The reviewer agrees that those may be the logical implications
of the decisions, but is not so certain that the Court is going to make them into
law. All in all, however, the author has performed a difficult task in a manner
that places those interested in this field of the law deeply in his debt.
Henry Rottschaefer.
University of Minnesota Law School.

The American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 1933. Pp. Vol. I, xxxiv, 636; Vol. II, xxviii, 754.
The reviewer of any of the Restatements prepared under the direction of
the American Law Institute necessarily approaches the task with deference.
The Restatements represent in the first instance the work of a leading authority
on the subject. In the case of Agency, a substantial part was originally prepared by the late Professor Floyd R. Mechem and subsequently redrafted by
Professor Warren A. Seavey to make it conform in style and arrangement to
the balance of the work which was done by Mr. Seavey. The drafts prepared
in this manner are studied and criticised by a group of advisors, likewise specially qualified in the particular field of the law, and revised accordingly. Then
the Restatement is submitted to the Council of the Institute and finally to the
members of the entire Institute for their comments and criticisms and, in the
light of these, put into final form, approved and published. It is to be expected
that the result of such careful and thorough preparation will be a work unusually free from obscurities, inaccuracies and inconsistencies. The Restatement
of the Law of Agency shows the effect of this exhaustive procedure in preparation.
The form in which this Restatement is presented is identical with that used
in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts. The rules of law are set forth
in heavy black letter type. This is followed by comments amplifying and explaining the rule stated and illustrations which further clarify the rule. In a
few instances where no opinion as to the rule in a particular case is given, it is
noted by a caveat which states the question and notes that no opinion is expressed.
To keep the size of the book within reasonable limits it has, of course,
been necessary, particularly in the black letter sections, to depend for accuracy
on scrupulously consistent and exact language and terminology without extensive qualifications. So much so in fact, that in some cases the comments state
additional rules and do not merely amplify and explain the rule of the black
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY.
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letter section.1 Except for a few such cases, however, the comments are limited to amplification and explanation and are clearly stated and very helpful to
the reader in obtaining a comprehension of the full meaning of the black letter
rules. The illustrations, while unnecessary to make the rules and comments
understandable, are very helpful, and the space they occupy entirely justified.
No effort is made to set forth or comment on the development of the rules,
the theories on which they are based, or their soundness. Where there is a split
of authority no mention is made of the fact and no reasons are given for adopting the rule which has been selected. The writer understands, however, that
in general the rule supported by the clear weight of authority has been adopted,
although the Reporter may personally believe that the one represented by the
minority is the better rule. Rules which have developed with reference to statutes adopted generally throughout the country are stated. A notable example
is the Statute of Frauds. In cases where many states have varied by statute
the common law as stated in the rules, attention is called to this fact in the
comments and occasionally a warning is included in the rule itself.
As a result of the method adopted as outlined in the preceding paragraph,
the value of the Restatement will be enhanced by the State Armotations which
are being prepared under the supervision of the various State Bar Associations.
These will indicate to what extent the law of the particular state is consistent
with the Restatement.
The Restatement covers the entire field of Agency including its subdivision, the relationship of master and servant. It includes the law applicable to
the creation of the relationship, the creation and interpretation of authority and
apparent authority, termination, ratification, and the rights, liabilities and duties
of each of the parties whose legal rights are involved, that is, principal, agent,
sub-agent and third party. There is also a very clear section setting forth the
"fellow servant" rules.
The legal results from the relations and acts ordinarily treated under the
head "Agency", in so many instances involve contract law that, as would be
expected, there are many references to the Restatement of the Law of Contracts. In many cases it is stated that the rules (giving section numbers) of
that Restatenent are the rules applicable to a particular agency question without further comment. In other cases, it is stated that questions do not come
within the scope of the Agency Restatement and reference is made to the Contracts Restatement. There are also frequent references to the Torts Restatement and a few to other Restatements which have not as yet been published.
In dealing with subjects on the border line, however, the Agency Restatement,
if anything, errs by stating rules which might be considered to belong more
properly in another Restatement and in several cases states rules of other subjects in a form bringing out their particular application to this subject.
A complete table of contents appears at the beginning of Volume I, and
a table of contents for the particular chapter at the beginning of each chapter.
The chapter headings give the subject matter of the chapter, each of which is
divided into several topics constituting sub-divisions of these headings and
these are further subdivided into titles. There are then set forth under the
various section numbers the catch-word headings of the black letter rules. The
table of contents thus furnishes a clear outline of the Restatement and by its
use one can readily find the rule applicable to any particular question.
The arrangement and divisions are logical and such that the references to
later sections are for the purpose of indicating where particular rules can be
found and are not essential to an understanding of the particular section. Where
the reference in a rule to other sections does not itself make clear the general
ISee for example § 4o7.
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content of the other sections, the comment ordinarily does so. Strict conformity to form has not been followed at the expense of convenience, as for example where a definition applies to a particular topic it is included under that topic
and not in the introductory definitions.
The Restatement or the Tentative Drafts have already been cited in thirtyeight reported cases, although the final volumes were not published until the
fall of 1933. These thirty-eight cases cite fifty-six sections, in all of which the
rule as set forth in the Restatement is cited as authority, and in none of them
is it stated to be contrary to the law of the particular jurisdiction.
An eminent jurist has stated that in all cases which come before his court
he will insist that counsel give the court the relevant rules from the Restate4
ments applicable to the case. He also stated that he intends to consider theRestatements as the law except where the decisions in his state are so clearly
to the contrary that to do so would unquestionably be judicial legislation. The
authority and excellence of these works justify taking such a position, and if it
is generally done by the courts, the law should be in the future a more certain
and less unnecessarily shifting guide to the careful citizen and more definitely
known to the bar.
G. Ruhland Rebmann, Jr.
Philadelphia, Pa.
PARLIAMENTARY OPINION OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION.

Columbia University Press, New York, 1933.

By Chih-Mai Chen.

Pp. 149.

Price: ,$2.25.

It is well known that the increasing disposition of the British Parliament
to delegate broad discretionary powers to local authorities and other administrative bodies, during and after the World War, raised a great hullabaloo in
England a few years since, to which Lord Chief Justice Hewart contributed
his rather hysterical volume, The New Despotism. It cannot be said that Mr.
Chen's survey of Parliamentary Opinion on the subject adds greatly to our
understanding of the issues involved. Rather it testifies to the necessity which
professors are often under to get subjects which their graduate students may
write theses about. The work, however, is competently done, and despite the
fact that the author is a Chinese, is uncommonly well written for the genre to
which it belongs. It also has a certain pertinence to issues raised in this country by the New Deal.
The superstitution that the legislature may not delegate its power is, of
course, a constitutional device of the laissez-faire conception of governmental
function. For if a prerequisite to the government acting at all is the enactment
of a statute covering in detail the situations to be dealt with, then in mode~n
conditions government may not act at all. If the maxim that the legislature
may not delegate its powers means only that the legislature cannot bind its
successors and hence cannot effect a permanent abdication of its powers, it is
harmless enough; if it means that the legislature is not entitled to make a really
effective use of its powers by delegating them for specified purposes, then it
is an intolerable nuisance. Fortunately, this appears to be about the opinion
at which our own Supreme Court arrived some years ago.
Edward S. Corwin.
Princeton University.
By Frank A. Magruder and Guy S. Claire. McGraw
Hill Co., New York, 1933. Pp. xii, 395. Price: $2.50.
The authors' thesis, stated in the preface, is to the effect that "Dictatorship is the outcome of popular ignorance of political and economic principles
. . .The purpose of this work is to explain the Constitution and the fundaTHE CONSTITUTION.
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mental governmental structure so simply and clearly that it can be understood
by any intelligent individual". Without passing on the authors' diagnosis of
the cause of dictatorship, but reviewing the work in the light of the statement
of purpose, as outlined in the second sentence quoted above, we can commend
it as an elementary annotation of our fundamental law. It should be useful
as a source book for a high school course in civics, but we doubt its adequacy
as a text for college students in political science. Its main value is for the
good citizen, who wants to know something about the fundamentals of our
governmental structure and who is too busy earning a livelihood to become an
expert in the field of government. Although most of the same material cas
be found in the official annotation of the United States Constitution,1 this work
is presented in a more palatable form. We recommend it to the tired business
man who desires a handy source book on the Constitution of the United States.
Forrest R. Black.
College of Law, University of Kentucky.

By J. H. Chadbourn. The University of North
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1933. Pp. xi, 221. Price, $2.oo.
Within the past two years lynching has become a serious social problem.
Prior to that time it was confined largely to the South and primarily to
negroes. These instances were lamentable but many considered that they were
the remnants of a vanishing period and that soon, under the influence of education and a better understanding between blacks and whites, they would disappear completely.
Recently, however, the evil has spread north, east, and west. One of the
most notorious cases indicating lynching's ominous growth occurred in Cali
fornia on November 26, 1933, when Thomas Thurmond and John Holmes,
both white, were taken from jail by a mob and hanged in a nearby park. In
cold blood they had murdered a lad and attempted to collect ransom. But the
crime of the mob was even greater than the crime committed by the two men
who were hanged. And more dangerous to society.
Only by chance was the life of another man saved after he was cruelly
beaten and maltreated under the mistaken belief that he was one of the kidnappers and murderers. This but illustrates one of the minor dangers of the
mob rule.
Unfortunately the Governor of California approved of this crime against
social order. He considered this to be "the best lesson California has ever
given the country". However, in contrast to this attitude, the Governor of
Maryland a few days later directed the movements of the officers of the law
to bring to trial those charged with leading the mob that hanged a negro charged
with rape in that state.
The rapid increase in the crime is indicated by the recent report by the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. An increase of
i8o per cent. in the number of lynchings in 1933 over 1932 is shown. During
this period, for various reasons, there has been a marked breakdown in the
administration of the law as a whole. Nevertheless, the potentialities of the
particular situation are alarming.
For these reasons, Professor Chadbourn's book is particularly timely. The
Institute for Research in Social Science of the University of North Carolina
and the College of Law of the same institution which sponsored the study are
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to be commended. In addition to news clippings and case studies, one thousand
questionnaires were sent out in obtaining the material.
The book is practical and most suggestive. It contains the actual legislation and administrative procedure in regard to lynching in the various states.
In addition, there are proposals for additional legislation and a Model Act. The
book points the way to practical reform by showing the present situation in detail, pointing out its defects, and, particularly, by indicating a charted road to
reform.
Roy Moreland.
College of Law, University of Kentucky.
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